



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
17 October 2007

Original: English

Sixty-second session

First Committee

Agenda item 105

**Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction**

Hungary: draft resolution

**Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction**

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and to their destruction,

Noting with satisfaction that there are one hundred and fifty-nine States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,¹ including all of the permanent members of the Security Council,

Bearing in mind its call upon all States parties to the Convention to participate in the implementation of the recommendations of the Review Conferences, including the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention,² and to provide such information and data in conformity with standardized procedure to the Secretary-General on an annual basis and no later than 15 April,

Welcoming the reaffirmation made in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference³ that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their development, production and stockpiling are effectively prohibited under article I of the Convention,

Welcoming also the successful outcome of the Sixth Review Conference, which adopted a Final Document⁴ after a gap of ten years,⁵ conducted a consensus

¹ Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

² BWC/CONF.III/23, part II.

³ BWC/CONF.IV/9, part II.

⁴ BWC/CONF.VI/6.

⁵ The previous full review was conducted at the Fourth Review Conference in 1996.



article-by-article review of the operation of the Convention, reached decisions on the continuity of the intersessional meetings of experts and States parties, and decided to establish an Implementation Support Unit,

Recalling the decision reached at the Sixth Review Conference to hold four annual meetings of the States parties of one week's duration each year commencing in 2007, prior to the Seventh Review Conference, which is to be held not later than the end of 2011, and to hold a one-week meeting of experts to prepare for each meeting of the States parties,⁶

1. *Notes with satisfaction* the increase in the number of States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,¹ reaffirms the call upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention;

2. *Welcomes* the information and data provided to date, and reiterates its call upon all States parties to the Convention to participate in the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention;²

3. *Takes note* of the decision of the Sixth Review Conference, taking into account the importance of providing administrative support to meetings agreed by the Review Conference as well as comprehensive implementation and universalization of the Convention and the exchange of confidence-building measures, to establish an Implementation Support Unit, funded by States parties, for the period from 2007-2011,⁷ within the framework defined by the Review Conference;

4. *Notes with satisfaction* that the Sixth Review Conference agreed on several measures to update the mechanism for the transmission of information in the framework of the confidence-building measures;

5. *Recalls* the decisions reached at the Sixth Review Conference,⁸ and calls upon States parties to the Convention to participate in their implementation;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Review Conferences, including all assistance to the annual meetings of the States parties and the meetings of experts;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-third session the item entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction".

⁶ BWC/CONF.VI/6, part III, para. 7.

⁷ BWC/CONF.VI/6, part III, paras. 5 and 6.

⁸ *Ibid.*, part III, paras. 1 and 7.



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
17 October 2007

Original: English

Sixty-second session

First Committee

Agenda item 98

General and complete disarmament

Argentina, Australia, Kenya, Thailand and Turkey: draft resolution

Prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 58/42 and 58/54 of 8 December 2003, 58/241 of 23 December 2003, 59/90 of 3 December 2004, 60/77 of 8 December 2005 and 60/288 of 8 September 2006, and its decision 60/519 of 8 December 2005,

Recognizing that disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation are essential for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Acknowledging the authorized trade in man-portable air defence systems between Governments and the legitimate right of Governments to possess such weapons in the interests of their national security,

Recognizing the threat to civil aviation, peacekeeping, crisis management and security posed by the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems,

Taking into account the fact that man-portable air defence systems are easily carried, concealed, fired and, in certain circumstances, obtained,

Recognizing that effective control over man-portable air defence systems acquires special importance in the context of the intensified international fight against global terrorism,

Convinced of the importance of effective national control of transfers of man-portable air defence systems and their training and instruction materials and of the safe and effective management of stockpiles of such weapons,

Acknowledging the role of the unauthorized transfer of relevant materials and information in assisting the illicit manufacture and illicit transfer of man-portable air defence systems and related components,



Welcoming the ongoing efforts of, and noting declarations by, various international and regional forums to enhance transport security, including through airport vulnerability assessments, and to strengthen management of man-portable air defence systems stockpiles in order to prevent the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of such weapons,

Noting the importance of information exchange and transparency in the trade in man-portable air defence systems to build confidence and security among States and to prevent the illicit trade in and unauthorized access to such weapons,

Acknowledging the considerable efforts of some Member States to collect, secure and destroy voluntarily those man-portable air defence systems declared to be surplus by the competent national authority,

1. *Emphasizes* the importance of the full implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects;¹

2. *Urges* Member States to support current international, regional and national efforts to combat and prevent the illicit transfer of man-portable air defence systems and unauthorized access to and use of such weapons;

3. *Stresses* the importance of effective and comprehensive national controls on the production, stockpiling, transfer and brokering of man-portable air defence systems to prevent the illicit trade in and unauthorized access to and use of such weapons, their components and training and instruction materials;

4. *Encourages* Member States to enact or improve legislation, regulations, procedures and stockpile management practices and to assist other States, at their request, to exercise effective control over access to and transfer of man-portable air defence systems so as to prevent the illicit brokering and transfer of and unauthorized access to and use of such weapons;

5. *Also encourages* Member States to enact or improve legislation, regulations and procedures to ban the transfer of man-portable air defence systems to non-State end-users and to ensure that such weapons are exported only to Governments or agents authorized by a Government;

6. *Encourages* initiatives to exchange information and to mobilize resources and technical expertise to assist States, at their request, in enhancing national controls and stockpile management practices to prevent unauthorized access to and use and transfer of man-portable air defence systems and to destroy excess or obsolete stockpiles of such weapons, as appropriate;

7. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

¹ See Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 9-20 July 2001 (A/CONF.192/15), chap. IV, para. 24.



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
29 October 2007

Original: English

Sixty-second session

First Committee

Agenda item 98

General and complete disarmament

Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and the United Kingdom: revised draft resolution

Prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 58/42 and 58/54 of 8 December 2003, 58/241 of 23 December 2003, 59/90 of 3 December 2004, 60/77 of 8 December 2005 and 60/288 of 8 September 2006, and its decision 60/519 of 8 December 2005,

Recognizing that disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation are essential for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Acknowledging the authorized trade in man-portable air defence systems between Governments,

Acknowledging also the legitimate right of Governments to manufacture, import, export, transfer and possess man-portable air defence systems in the interests of their national security and self-defence,

Recognizing the threat to civil aviation, peacekeeping, crisis management and security posed by the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems,

Taking into account the fact that man-portable air defence systems are easily carried, concealed, fired and, in certain circumstances, obtained,



Recognizing that effective control over man-portable air defence systems acquires special importance in the context of the intensified international fight against global terrorism,

Convinced of the importance of effective national control of transfers of man-portable air defence systems and their training and instruction materials and of the safe and effective management of stockpiles of such weapons,

Acknowledging the role of the unauthorized transfer of relevant materials and information in assisting the illicit manufacture and illicit transfer of man-portable air defence systems and related components,

Welcoming the ongoing efforts of, and noting declarations by, various international and regional forums to enhance transport security, including through airport vulnerability assessments, and to strengthen management of man-portable air defence systems stockpiles in order to prevent the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of such weapons,

Noting the importance of information exchange and transparency in the trade in man-portable air defence systems to build confidence and security among States and to prevent the illicit trade in and unauthorized access to such weapons,

Acknowledging the considerable efforts of some Member States to collect, secure and destroy voluntarily those man-portable air defence systems declared to be surplus by the competent national authority,

1. *Emphasizes* the importance of the full implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects;¹

2. *Urges* Member States to support current international, regional and national efforts to combat and prevent the illicit transfer of man-portable air defence systems and unauthorized access to and use of such weapons;

3. *Stresses* the importance of effective and comprehensive national controls on the production, stockpiling, transfer and brokering of man-portable air defence systems to prevent the illicit trade in and unauthorized access to and use of such weapons, their components and training and instruction materials;

4. *Encourages* Member States to enact or improve legislation, regulations, procedures and stockpile management practices and to assist other States, at their request, to exercise effective control over access to and transfer of man-portable air defence systems so as to prevent the illicit brokering and transfer of and unauthorized access to and use of such weapons;

5. *Also encourages* Member States, in accordance with their legal and constitutional processes, to enact or improve legislation, regulations and procedures to ban the transfer of man-portable air defence systems to non-State end-users and to ensure that such weapons are exported only to Governments or agents authorized by a Government;

¹ See Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 9-20 July 2001 (A/CONF.192/15), chap. IV, para. 24.

6. *Encourages* initiatives to exchange information and to mobilize resources and technical expertise to assist States, at their request, in enhancing national controls and stockpile management practices to prevent unauthorized access to and use and transfer of man-portable air defence systems and to destroy excess or obsolete stockpiles of such weapons, as appropriate;

7. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

**General Assembly**

Distr.: Limited
17 October 2007

Original: English

Sixty-second session

First Committee

Agenda item 98 (x)

**General and complete disarmament: implementation of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and
on Their Destruction**

Australia, Croatia and Jordan: draft resolution

**Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and
on Their Destruction**

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 54/54 B of 1 December 1999, 55/33 V of 20 November 2000, 56/24 M of 29 November 2001, 57/74 of 22 November 2002, 58/53 of 8 December 2003, 59/84 of 3 December 2004, 60/80 of 8 December 2005, and 61/84 of 6 December 2006,

Reaffirming its determination to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, which kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians, including children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do the utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to facing the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do the utmost in ensuring assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration, of mine victims,

Recalling that 2007 marks the tenth anniversary of the adoption and opening for signature of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,¹ and welcoming its entry into force on 1 March 1999,

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2056, No. 35597.



Noting with satisfaction the work undertaken to implement the Convention and the substantial progress made towards ending, for all people and for all time, the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines, as well as regular reporting of this progress,

Recalling the first to seventh meetings of the States parties to the Convention held in Maputo (1999),² Geneva (2000),³ Managua (2001),⁴ Geneva (2002),⁵ Bangkok (2003),⁶ and Zagreb (2005),⁷ and Geneva (2006),⁸ and the First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, held in Nairobi (2004),⁹

Noting with satisfaction that additional States have ratified or acceded to the Convention, bringing the total number of States that have formally accepted the obligations of the Convention to one hundred and fifty-five,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to the Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization,

Noting with regret that anti-personnel mines continue to be used in conflicts around the world, causing human suffering and impeding post-conflict development,

1. *Invites all States that have not signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction¹ to accede to it without delay;*

2. *Urges all States that have signed but have not ratified the Convention to ratify it without delay;*

3. *Stresses the importance of the full and effective implementation of and compliance with the Convention, including through the continued implementation of the Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009;¹⁰*

4. *Urges all States parties to provide the Secretary-General with complete and timely information as required under article 7 of the Convention in order to promote transparency and compliance with the Convention;*

5. *Invites all States that have not ratified the Convention or acceded to it to provide, on a voluntary basis, information to make global mine action efforts more effective;*

6. *Renews its call upon all States and other relevant parties to work together to promote, support and advance the care, rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration of mine victims, mine risk education programmes and the removal and destruction of anti-personnel mines placed or stockpiled throughout the world;*

7. *Urges all States to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level and, where in a position to do so, to promote adherence to the Convention through*

² See APLC/MSP.1/1999/1.

³ See APLC/MSP.2/2000/1.

⁴ See APLC/MSP.3/2001/1.

⁵ See APLC/MSP.4/2002/1.

⁶ See APLC/MSP.5/2003/5.

⁷ See APLC/MSP.6/2005/5.

⁸ See APLC/MSP.7/2006/5.

⁹ See APLC/CONF/2004/5 and Corr.1.

¹⁰ Ibid., part III.

bilateral, subregional, regional and multilateral contacts, outreach, seminars and other means;

8. *Reiterates* its invitation and encouragement to all interested States, the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations to participate in the eighth meeting of the States parties to the Convention, to be held in Jordan from 18 to 22 November 2007, and in the intersessional work programme established at the first meeting of the States parties and further developed at subsequent meetings of the States parties;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in accordance with article 11, paragraph 2, of the Convention, to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the next meeting of the States parties and, pending a decision to be taken at the eighth meeting of States parties, and on behalf of the States parties and in accordance with article 11, paragraph 4, of the Convention, to invite States not parties to the Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations to attend the ninth meeting of the States parties as observers;

10. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
17 October 2007

Original: English

Sixty-second session

First Committee

Agenda item 98 (s)

General and complete disarmament: nuclear disarmament

Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Congo, Cuba, Guinea, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Philippines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Thailand, Uganda, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Zimbabwe: draft resolution

Nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 49/75 E of 15 December 1994 on a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat, and its resolutions 50/70 P of 12 December 1995, 51/45 O of 10 December 1996, 52/38 L of 9 December 1997, 53/77 X of 4 December 1998, 54/54 P of 1 December 1999, 55/33 T of 20 November 2000, 56/24 R of 29 November 2001, 57/79 of 22 November 2002, 58/56 of 8 December 2003, 59/77 of 3 December 2004, 60/70 of 8 December 2005 and 61/78 of 6 December 2006 on nuclear disarmament,

Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

Bearing in mind that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1972¹ and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1993² have already established legal regimes on the complete prohibition of biological and chemical weapons, respectively, and determined to achieve a nuclear weapons convention on the prohibition of the development, testing, production, stockpiling, loan, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear

¹ Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1974, No. 33757.



weapons and on their destruction, and to conclude such an international convention at an early date,

Recognizing that there now exist conditions for the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons, and stressing the need to take concrete practical steps towards achieving this goal,

Bearing in mind paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,³ the first special session devoted to disarmament, calling for the urgent negotiation of agreements for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, and for a comprehensive and phased programme with agreed time frames, wherever feasible, for the progressive and balanced reduction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time,

Reaffirming the conviction of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons⁴ that the Treaty is a cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and the importance of the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the decision on the extension of the Treaty and the resolution on the Middle East, adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,⁵

Stressing the importance of the thirteen steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve the objective of nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as agreed to by the States parties in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,⁶

Reiterating the highest priority accorded to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and by the international community,

Reiterating its call for an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,⁷

Noting with appreciation the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I),⁸ to which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America are States parties,

Noting with appreciation also the entry into force of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty") between the United States of America

³ Resolution S-10/2.

⁴ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 729, No. 10485.

⁵ See 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, *Final Document, Part I* (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and Corr.2), annex.

⁶ See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, *Final Document*, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", para. 15.

⁷ See resolution 50/245.

⁸ *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.92.IX.1), appendix II.

and the Russian Federation⁹ as a significant step towards reducing their deployed strategic nuclear weapons, while calling for further irreversible deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals.

Noting with appreciation further the unilateral measures taken by the nuclear-weapon States for nuclear arms limitation, and encouraging them to take further such measures, while reiterating deep concern over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States towards accomplishing the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals,

Recognizing the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and that bilateral negotiations can never replace multilateral negotiations in this respect,

Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the multilateral efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on such an international convention at an early date,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, issued on 8 July 1996,¹⁰ and welcoming the unanimous reaffirmation by all Judges of the Court that there exists an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

Mindful of paragraph 64 of the Final Document of the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Putrajaya, Malaysia, on 29 and 30 May 2006,¹¹

Recalling paragraph 70 and other relevant recommendations in the Final Document of the Fourteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Havana on 15 and 16 September 2006,¹² calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and to commence negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time framework,

Reaffirming the specific mandate conferred upon the Disarmament Commission by the General Assembly, in its decision 52/492 of 8 September 1998, to discuss the subject of nuclear disarmament as one of its main substantive agenda items,

Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration,¹³ in which Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for

⁹ See CD/1674.

¹⁰ A/51/218, annex; see also *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996*, p. 226.

¹¹ A/60/1002-S/2006/718, annex I.

¹² A/61/472-S/2006/780, annex I.

¹³ See resolution 55/2.

achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States should refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in settling their disputes in international relations,

Seized of the danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, in terrorist acts and the urgent need for concerted international efforts to control and overcome it,

1. *Recognizes* that the time is now opportune for all the nuclear-weapon States to take effective disarmament measures with a view to achieving the elimination of these weapons;

2. *Reaffirms* that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are substantively interrelated and mutually reinforcing, that the two processes must go hand in hand and that there is a genuine need for a systematic and progressive process of nuclear disarmament;

3. *Welcomes and encourages* the efforts to establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned, which is an effective measure for limiting the further spread of nuclear weapons geographically and contributes to the cause of nuclear disarmament;

4. *Recognizes* that there is a genuine need to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

5. *Urges* the nuclear-weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems;

6. *Also urges* the nuclear-weapon States, as an interim measure, to de-alert and deactivate immediately their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear-weapon systems;

7. *Reiterates its call upon* the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to achieving the total elimination of these weapons;

8. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to agree on an internationally and legally binding instrument on a joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and calls upon all States to conclude an internationally and legally binding instrument on security assurances of non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;

9. *Urges* the nuclear-weapon States to commence plurilateral negotiations among themselves at an appropriate stage on further deep reductions of nuclear weapons as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament;

10. *Underlines* the importance of applying the principle of irreversibility to the process of nuclear disarmament, and nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures;

11. *Underscores* the importance of the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty,¹⁴ and the reaffirmation by the States parties that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;¹⁵

12. *Calls for* the full and effective implementation of the thirteen steps for nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference;⁶

13. *Urges* the nuclear-weapon States to carry out further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

14. *Calls for* the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator¹⁶ and the mandate contained therein;

15. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years;

16. *Calls for* the conclusion of an international legal instrument or instruments on adequate security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States;

17. *Also calls for* the early entry into force and strict observance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;⁷

18. *Expresses its regret* that the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was unable to achieve any substantive result and that the 2005 World Summit Outcome adopted by the General Assembly¹⁷ failed to make any reference to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation;

19. *Also expresses its regret* that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to establish an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament early in 2007, as called for by the General Assembly in its resolution 61/78;

20. *Reiterates its call upon* the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament early in 2008

¹⁴ 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", para. 15:6.

¹⁵ Ibid., section entitled "Article VII and the security of non-nuclear weapon States", para. 2.

¹⁶ CD/1299.

¹⁷ See resolution 60/1.

and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons;

21. *Calls for* the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects at an early date to identify and deal with concrete measures of nuclear disarmament;

22. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

23. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-third session the item entitled "Nuclear disarmament".



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
17 October 2007

Original: English

Sixty-second session

First Committee

Agenda item 98 (q)

General and complete disarmament: transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities

Armenia, Austria, Belarus, China, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of): draft resolution

Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 60/66 of 8 December 2005 and 61/75 of 6 December 2006,

Reaffirming that the prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger to international peace and security,

Conscious that further measures should be examined in the search for agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space, including the weaponization of outer space,

Recalling, in this context, its previous resolutions, including resolutions 45/55 B of 4 December 1990 and 48/74 B of 16 December 1993, which, inter alia, emphasize the need for increased transparency and confirm the importance of confidence-building measures as a means conducive to ensuring the attainment of the objective of the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Recalling also the report of the Secretary-General of 15 October 1993 to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session, the annex to which contains the study by governmental experts on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space,¹

Noting the constructive debate which the Conference on Disarmament held on this subject in 2007,

¹ A/48/305 and Corr.1.



Noting also the contribution of Member States which have submitted to the Secretary-General concrete proposals on international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures pursuant to paragraph 1 of resolution 61/75,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General containing concrete proposals from Member States on international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures;²

2. *Invites* all Member States to continue to submit to the Secretary-General concrete proposals on international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session a report with an annex containing concrete proposals from Member States on international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-third session the item entitled "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities".

² A/62/114 and Add.1.



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
17 October 2007

Original: English

Sixty-second session

First Committee

Agenda item 98 (v)

**General and complete disarmament: conventional arms
control at the regional and subregional levels**

**Bangladesh, Belarus, Egypt, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Spain, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine: draft resolution**

Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 48/75 J of 16 December 1993, 49/75 O of 15 December 1994, 50/70 L of 12 December 1995, 51/45 Q of 10 December 1996, 52/38 Q of 9 December 1997, 53/77 P of 4 December 1998, 54/54 M of 1 December 1999, 55/33 P of 20 November 2000, 56/24 I of 29 November 2001, 57/77 of 22 November 2002, 58/39 of 8 December 2003, 59/88 of 3 December 2004, 60/75 of 8 December 2005 and 61/82 of 6 December 2006,

Recognizing the crucial role of conventional arms control in promoting regional and international peace and security,

Convinced that conventional arms control needs to be pursued primarily in the regional and subregional contexts since most threats to peace and security in the post-cold-war era arise mainly among States located in the same region or subregion,

Aware that the preservation of a balance in the defence capabilities of States at the lowest level of armaments would contribute to peace and stability and should be a prime objective of conventional arms control,

Desirous of promoting agreements to strengthen regional peace and security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces,

Noting with particular interest the initiatives taken in this regard in different regions of the world, in particular the commencement of consultations among a number of Latin American countries and the proposals for conventional arms control made in the context of South Asia, and recognizing, in the context of this subject,



the relevance and value of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,¹ which is a cornerstone of European security,

Believing that militarily significant States and States with larger military capabilities have a special responsibility in promoting such agreements for regional security,

Believing also that an important objective of conventional arms control in regions of tension should be to prevent the possibility of military attack launched by surprise and to avoid aggression,

1. *Decides* to give urgent consideration to the issues involved in conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control, and looks forward to a report of the Conference on this subject;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in the meantime, to seek the views of Member States on the subject and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-third session the item entitled "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels".

¹ CD/1064.



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
17 October 2007

Original: English

Sixty-second session

First Committee

Agenda item 98 (u)

General and complete disarmament: confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context

Bangladesh, Colombia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine: draft resolution

Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling its resolutions 58/43 of 8 December 2003, 59/87 of 3 December 2004, 60/64 of 8 December 2005 and 61/81 of 6 December 2006,

Recalling also its resolution 57/337 of 3 July 2003 entitled "Prevention of armed conflict", in which it calls upon Member States to settle their disputes by peaceful means, as set out in Chapter VI of the Charter, inter alia, by any procedures adopted by the parties,

Recalling further the resolutions and guidelines adopted by consensus by the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission relating to confidence-building measures and their implantation at the global, regional and subregional levels,

Considering the importance and effectiveness of confidence-building measures taken at the initiative and with the agreement of all States concerned, and taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, since such measures can contribute to regional stability,

Convinced that resources released by disarmament, including regional disarmament, can be devoted to economic and social development and to the protection of the environment for the benefit of all peoples, in particular those of the developing countries,

Recognizing the need for meaningful dialogue among States concerned to avert conflict,



Welcoming the peace processes already initiated by States concerned to resolve their disputes through peaceful means bilaterally or through mediation, inter alia, by third parties, regional organizations or the United Nations,

Recognizing that States in some regions have already taken steps towards confidence-building measures at the bilateral, subregional and regional levels in the political and military fields, including arms control and disarmament, and noting that such confidence-building measures have improved peace and security in those regions and contributed to progress in the socio-economic conditions of their people,

Concerned that the continuation of disputes among States, particularly in the absence of an effective mechanism to resolve them through peaceful means, may contribute to the arms race and endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and the efforts of the international community to promote arms control and disarmament,

1. *Calls upon* Member States to refrain from the use or threat of use of force in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
2. *Reaffirms its commitment* to the peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter, in particular Article 33, which provides for a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means chosen by the parties;
3. *Reaffirms* the ways and means regarding confidence- and security-building measures set out in the report of the Disarmament Commission on its 1993 session;¹
4. *Calls upon* Member States to pursue these ways and means through sustained consultations and dialogue, while at the same time avoiding actions that may hinder or impair such a dialogue;
5. *Urges* States to comply strictly with all bilateral, regional and international agreements, including arms control and disarmament agreements, to which they are party;
6. *Emphasizes* that the objective of confidence-building measures should be to help strengthen international peace and security and be consistent with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments;
7. *Encourages* the promotion of bilateral and regional confidence-building measures, with the consent and participation of the parties concerned, to avoid conflict and prevent the unintended and accidental outbreak of hostilities;
8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session containing the views of Member States on confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context;
9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-third session the item entitled "Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context".

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/48/42), annex II, sect. III.A.*



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
17 October 2007

Original: English

Sixty-second session

First Committee

Agenda item 95

Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Viet Nam and Zambia: draft resolution

Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Welcoming the progress achieved in recent years in both nuclear and conventional disarmament,

Noting that, despite recent progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, further efforts are necessary towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Determined to abide strictly by the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or threat of force,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,



Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures and arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures and arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can contribute positively to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,¹ the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document,

Recalling the relevant parts of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament² submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session,³ the second special session devoted to disarmament, and of the special report of the Conference on Disarmament submitted to the Assembly at its fifteenth special session,⁴ the third special session devoted to disarmament, as well as the report of the Conference on its 1992 session,⁵

Recalling also paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, inter alia, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons,⁶ with a view to reaching agreement on this question,

Taking note of the proposals submitted under the item in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

Taking note also of the relevant decision of the Thirteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Kuala Lumpur on 24 and 25 February 2003,⁷ which was reiterated at the Fourteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana on 15 and 16 September 2006,⁸ as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference,

¹ Resolution S-10/2.

² The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated the Conference on Disarmament as from 7 February 1984.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 2* (A/S-12/2), sect. III.C.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 2* (A/S-15/2), sect. III.F.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/47/27), sect. III.F.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/48/27), para. 39.

⁷ See A/57/759-S/2003/332, annex I.

⁸ See A/61/472-S/2006/780, annex I.

Taking note further of the unilateral declarations made by all the nuclear-weapon States on their policies of non-use or non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States,

Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

Taking note of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 and the views expressed on it,

Recalling its relevant resolutions adopted in previous years, in particular resolutions 45/54 of 4 December 1990, 46/32 of 6 December 1991, 47/50 of 9 December 1992, 48/73 of 16 December 1993, 49/73 of 15 December 1994, 50/68 of 12 December 1995, 51/43 of 10 December 1996, 52/36 of 9 December 1997, 53/75 of 4 December 1998, 54/52 of 1 December 1999, 55/31 of 20 November 2000, 56/22 of 29 November 2001, 57/56 of 22 November 2002, 58/35 of 8 December 2003, 59/64 of 3 December 2004, 60/53 of 8 December 2005 and 61/57 of 6 December 2006,

1. *Reaffirms* the urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties with regard to evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;

3. *Appeals* to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. *Recommends* that further intensive efforts be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including, in particular, those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, be explored further in order to overcome the difficulties;

5. *Also recommends* that the Conference on Disarmament actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international agreements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-third session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
17 October 2007
English
Original: Russian

Sixty-second session

First Committee

Agenda item 93

**Developments in the field of information and telecommunications
in the context of international security**

**Armenia, Belarus, Chile, China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar,
Mali, Myanmar, Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: draft resolution**

Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 53/70 of 4 December 1998, 54/49 of 1 December 1999, 55/28 of 20 November 2000, 56/19 of 29 November 2001, 57/53 of 22 November 2002, 58/32 of 8 December 2003, 59/61 of 3 December 2004, 60/45 of 8 December 2005 and 61/54 of 6 December 2006,

Recalling also its resolutions on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, in which, inter alia, it recognized that scientific and technological developments could have both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needed to be maintained and encouraged,

Noting that considerable progress has been achieved in developing and applying the latest information technologies and means of telecommunication,

Affirming that it sees in this process the broadest positive opportunities for the further development of civilization, the expansion of opportunities for cooperation for the common good of all States, the enhancement of the creative potential of humankind and additional improvements in the circulation of information in the global community,

Recalling, in this connection, the approaches and principles outlined at the Information Society and Development Conference, held in Midrand, South Africa, from 13 to 15 May 1996,



Bearing in mind the results of the Ministerial Conference on Terrorism, held in Paris on 30 July 1996, and the recommendations that it made,¹

Bearing in mind also the results of the World Summit on the Information Society, held in Geneva from 10 to 12 December 2003 (first phase) and in Tunis from 16 to 18 November 2005 (second phase),²

Noting that the dissemination and use of information technologies and means affect the interests of the entire international community and that optimum effectiveness is enhanced by broad international cooperation,

Expressing its concern that these technologies and means can potentially be used for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security and may adversely affect the integrity of the infrastructure of States to the detriment of their security in both civil and military fields,

Considering that it is necessary to prevent the use of information resources or technologies for criminal or terrorist purposes,

Noting the contribution of those Member States that have submitted their assessments on issues of information security to the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of resolutions 53/70, 54/49, 55/28, 56/19, 57/53, 58/32, 59/61, 60/45 and 61/54,

Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General containing those assessments,³

Welcoming the initiative taken by the Secretariat and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in convening an international meeting of experts in Geneva in August 1999 on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, as well as its results,

Considering that the assessments of the Member States contained in the reports of the Secretary-General and the international meeting of experts have contributed to a better understanding of the substance of issues of international information security and related notions,

Bearing in mind that the Secretary-General, in fulfilment of resolution 58/32, established in 2004 a group of governmental experts, which, in accordance with its mandate, considered existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them and conducted a study on relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, prepared on the basis of the results of the Group's work,⁴

¹ See A/51/261, annex.

² See A/C.2/59/3 and A/60/687.

³ A/54/213, A/55/140 and Corr.1 and Add.1, A/56/164 and Add.1, A/57/166 and Add.1, A/58/373, A/59/116 and Add.1, A/60/95 and Add.1, A/61/161 and Add.1.

⁴ A/60/202.

1. *Calls upon* Member States to promote further at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security, as well as possible measures to limit the threats emerging in this field, consistent with the need to preserve the free flow of information;
2. *Considers* that the purpose of such measures could be served through the examination of relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems;
3. *Invites* all Member States to continue to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on the following questions:
 - (a) General appreciation of the issues of information security;
 - (b) Efforts taken at the national level to strengthen information security and promote international cooperation in this field;
 - (c) The content of the concepts mentioned in paragraph 2 above;
 - (d) Possible measures that could be taken by the international community to strengthen information security at the global level;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, to be established in 2009 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, to continue to study existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them, as well as the concepts referred to in paragraph 2 above, and to submit a report on the results of this study to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session;
5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-third session the item entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security".



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
18 October 2007
English
Original: French

Sixty-second session

First Committee

Agenda item 98 (c)

General and complete disarmament: preventing the risk of radiological terrorism

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the essential contribution of radioactive materials and sources to social and economic development, and the benefits drawn from their use for all States,

Recognizing also the determination of the international community to combat terrorism, as evident in relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions,

Deeply concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that terrorists may acquire, traffic in or use radioactive materials or sources in radiological dispersion devices,

Recalling the importance of international conventions aiming at preventing and suppressing such a risk, in particular the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted on 13 April 2005,¹

Noting that actions of the international community to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and prevent access by non-State actors to weapons of mass destruction and related material, in particular Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, all constitute major contributions to the protection against nuclear and radiological terrorism,

Stressing the importance of the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in promoting and reinforcing the safety and security of radioactive materials and

¹ Resolution 59/290, annex.



sources, in particular by supporting the improvement of national legal and regulatory infrastructure and by establishing technical guidance.

Taking note of the importance of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management² with respect to the safety of the end of life of radioactive sources,

Taking note also of the importance of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources³ as a valuable instrument for enhancing the safety and security of radioactive sources, while recognizing that the Code is not a legally binding instrument, and of the International Atomic Energy Agency Revised Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources⁴ and its Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009,⁵

Taking note further of resolutions GC(51)/RES/11 including preambular paragraph (I) of section B, and GC(51)/RES/12, adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its fifty-first regular session, which address measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management and measures to protect against nuclear and radiological terrorism,

Welcoming the ongoing individual and collective efforts of Member States to take into account in their deliberations the dangers posed by the lack or insufficiency of control over radioactive materials and sources, and recognizing the need for States to take more effective measures to strengthen those controls in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law,

Welcoming also the fact that Member States have undertaken multilateral actions to address this issue, as reflected in General Assembly resolution 61/8 of 30 October 2006,

Welcoming further the contribution of the International Atomic Energy Agency International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Towards a Global System for the Continuous Control of Sources throughout Their Life Cycle, held in Bordeaux, France, from 27 June to 1 July 2005, to the activities of the Agency on these issues,

Mindful of the urgent need for addressing, within the United Nations framework and through international cooperation, this rising concern for international security,

1. *Calls upon* Member States to support international efforts to prevent the acquisition and use by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources, and, if necessary, suppress such acts, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;

2. *Urges* Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent the acquisition and use by terrorists of radioactive materials

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2153, No. 37605.

³ International Atomic Energy Agency, *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources* (IAEA/CODEOC/2004).

⁴ GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12, attachment.

⁵ See GC(49)/17.

and sources, as well as terrorist attacks on nuclear plants and facilities which would result in radioactive releases, and, if necessary, suppress such acts, in particular by taking effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect such materials and sources in accordance with their international obligations:

3. *Recalls* that Member States have the obligation to develop and maintain effective border controls, noting that such systems would contribute to the detection of the illicit trafficking in radioactive materials and sources, and encourages Member States to extend such detection to additional appropriate locations inside their territory;

4. *Welcomes* the entry into force, on 7 July 2007 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism¹ and invites all Member States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify this instrument as soon as possible;

5. *Invites* Member States, in particular those producing and distributing radioactive sources, to support and endorse the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to enhance the safety of radioactive sources, as described in GC(51)/RES/11 of the Agency's General Conference, and to enhance the security of radioactive sources as described in the Agency's Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009,⁵ urges all States to work towards following the guidance contained in the Agency's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,⁵ including, as appropriate, the guidance on the import and export of radioactive sources, noting that the guidance is supplementary to the Code, and encourages Member States to notify the Director General of the Agency of their intention to do so pursuant to resolution GC(48)/RES/10 of the General Conference of the Agency;⁶

6. *Recognizes* the value of information exchange on national approaches to controlling radioactive sources and takes note of the endorsement by the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors of a proposal for a formalized process for a voluntary periodic exchange on information and lessons learned and for the evaluation of progress made by States towards implementing the provisions of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources;⁵

7. *Welcomes* the efforts undertaken by Member States, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency or of international partnerships, whose activities usefully complement the Agency's actions to search for, locate and secure unsecured and/or uncontrolled sources ("orphan radioactive sources");

8. *Encourages* cooperation among and between Member States and through relevant international and, where appropriate, regional organizations as well as international partnerships and initiatives for strengthening national capacities in this regard;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fourth session an item entitled "Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources".

⁶ Ibid., Forty-eighth Regular Session, 20-24 September 2004 (GC(48)/RES/DEC(2004)).



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
29 October 2007
English
Original: French

Sixty-second session

First Committee

Agenda item 98 (e)

General and complete disarmament: preventing the risk of radiological terrorism

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the essential contribution of radioactive materials and sources to social and economic development, and the benefits drawn from their use for all States,

Recognizing also the determination of the international community to combat terrorism, as evident in relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions,

Deeply concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that terrorists may acquire, traffic in or use radioactive materials or sources in radiological dispersion devices,

Recalling the importance of international conventions aiming at preventing and suppressing such a risk, in particular the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted on 13 April 2005,¹

Noting that actions of the international community to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and prevent access by non-State actors to weapons of mass destruction and related material, in particular Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, all constitute major contributions to the protection against nuclear and radiological terrorism,

Stressing the importance of the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in promoting and reinforcing the safety and security of radioactive materials and

* Reissued for technical reasons.

¹ Resolution 59/290, annex.



sources, in particular by supporting the improvement of national legal and regulatory infrastructure and by establishing technical guidance,

Taking note of the importance of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management² with respect to the safety of the end of life of radioactive sources,

Taking note also of the importance of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources³ as a valuable instrument for enhancing the safety and security of radioactive sources, while recognizing that the Code is not a legally binding instrument, and of the International Atomic Energy Agency Revised Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources⁴ and its Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009,⁵

Taking note further of resolutions GC(51)/RES/11 including preambular paragraph (I) of section B, and GC(51)/RES/12, adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its fifty-first regular session, which address measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management and measures to protect against nuclear and radiological terrorism,

Welcoming the ongoing individual and collective efforts of Member States to take into account in their deliberations the dangers posed by the lack or insufficiency of control over radioactive materials and sources, and recognizing the need for States to take more effective measures to strengthen those controls in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law,

Welcoming also the fact that Member States have undertaken multilateral actions to address this issue, as reflected in General Assembly resolution 61/8 of 30 October 2006,

Welcoming further the contribution of the International Atomic Energy Agency International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Towards a Global System for the Continuous Control of Sources throughout Their Life Cycle, held in Bordeaux, France, from 27 June to 1 July 2005, to the activities of the Agency on these issues,

Mindful of the urgent need for addressing, within the United Nations framework and through international cooperation, this rising concern for international security,

1. *Calls upon* Member States to support international efforts to prevent the acquisition and use by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources, and, if necessary, suppress such acts, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;

2. *Urges* Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent the acquisition and use by terrorists of radioactive materials

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2153, No. 37605.

³ International Atomic Energy Agency, *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources* (IAEA/CODEOC/2004).

⁴ GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12, attachment.

⁵ See GC(49)/17.

and sources, as well as terrorist attacks on nuclear plants and facilities which would result in radioactive releases, and, if necessary, suppress such acts, in particular by taking effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect such materials and sources in accordance with their international obligations;

3. *Recalls* that Member States have the obligation to develop and maintain effective border controls, noting that such systems would contribute to the detection of the illicit trafficking in radioactive materials and sources, and encourages Member States to extend such detection to additional appropriate locations inside their territory;

4. *Welcomes* the entry into force, on 7 July 2007 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism¹ and invites all Member States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify this instrument as soon as possible;

5. *Invites* Member States, in particular those producing and distributing radioactive sources, to support and endorse the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to enhance the safety of radioactive sources, as described in GC(51)/RES/11 of the Agency's General Conference, and to enhance the security of radioactive sources as described in the Agency's Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009,⁵ urges all States to work towards following the guidance contained in the Agency's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,³ including, as appropriate, the guidance on the import and export of radioactive sources, noting that the guidance is supplementary to the Code, and encourages Member States to notify the Director General of the Agency of their intention to do so pursuant to resolution GC(48)/RES/10 of the General Conference of the Agency;⁶

6. *Recognizes* the value of information exchange on national approaches to controlling radioactive sources and takes note of the endorsement by the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors of a proposal for a formalized process for a voluntary periodic exchange on information and lessons learned and for the evaluation of progress made by States towards implementing the provisions of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources;⁵

7. *Welcomes* the efforts undertaken by Member States, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency or of international partnerships, whose activities usefully complement the Agency's actions to search for, locate and secure unsecured and/or uncontrolled sources ("orphan radioactive sources");

8. *Encourages* cooperation among and between Member States and through relevant international and, where appropriate, regional organizations as well as international partnerships and initiatives for strengthening national capacities in this regard;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fourth session an item entitled "Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources".

⁶ Ibid., Forty-eighth Regular Session, 20-24 September 2004 (GC(48)/RES/DEC(2004)).



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
1 November 2007

Original: English

Sixty-second session

First Committee

Agenda item 98 (e)

**General and complete disarmament: preventing
the risk of radiological terrorism**

Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: revised draft resolution

**Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials
and sources**

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the essential contribution of radioactive materials and sources to social and economic development, and the benefits drawn from their use for all States,

Recognizing also the determination of the international community to combat terrorism, as evident in relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions,

Deeply concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that terrorists may acquire, traffic in or use radioactive materials or sources in radiological dispersion devices,

Recalling the importance of international conventions aiming at preventing and suppressing such a risk, in particular the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted on 13 April 2005,¹ and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted on 26 October 1979, as well as its Amendment, adopted on 8 July 2005,

Noting that actions of the international community to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and prevent access by non-State actors to weapons of mass destruction and related material, notably Security Council resolution 1540

¹ Resolution 59/290, annex.



(2004) of 28 April 2004, constitute contributions to the protection against nuclear and radiological terrorism,

Stressing the importance of the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in promoting and reinforcing the safety and security of radioactive materials and sources, in particular by supporting the improvement of national legal and regulatory infrastructure and by establishing technical guidance,

Taking note of the importance of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management² with respect to the safety of the end of life of radioactive sources,

Taking note also of the importance of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources³ as a valuable instrument for enhancing the safety and security of radioactive sources, while recognizing that the Code is not a legally binding instrument, and of the International Atomic Energy Agency Revised Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources⁴ and its Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009,⁵

Taking note further of resolutions GC(51)/RES/11 and GC(51)/RES/12, adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its fifty-first regular session, which address measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management and measures to protect against nuclear and radiological terrorism,⁶

Welcoming the ongoing individual and collective efforts of Member States to take into account in their deliberations the dangers posed by the lack or insufficiency of control over radioactive materials and sources, and recognizing the need for States to take more effective measures to strengthen those controls in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law,

Welcoming also the fact that Member States have taken multilateral actions to address this issue, as reflected in General Assembly resolution 61/8 of 30 October 2006,

Welcoming further the contribution of the International Atomic Energy Agency International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Towards a Global System for the Continuous Control of Sources throughout Their Life Cycle, held in Bordeaux, France, from 27 June to 1 July 2005, to the activities of the Agency on these issues,

Mindful of the responsibilities of every Member State, in accordance with international obligations, to maintain effective nuclear safety and security, asserting that responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State, and noting the important contribution of international cooperation in supporting the efforts of States to fulfil their responsibilities,

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2153, No. 37605.

³ International Atomic Energy Agency, *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources* (IAEA/CODEOC/2004).

⁴ GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12, attachment.

⁵ See GC(49)/17.

⁶ See International Atomic Energy Agency, *Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference, Forty-ninth Regular Session, 26-30 September 2005* (GC(49)/RES/DEC(2005)).

Mindful also of the urgent need for addressing, within the United Nations framework and through international cooperation, this rising concern for international security,

1. *Calls upon Member States to support international efforts to prevent the acquisition and use by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources, and, if necessary, suppress such acts, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;*

2. *Urges Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent the acquisition and use by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources, as well as terrorist attacks on nuclear plants and facilities which would result in radioactive releases, and, if necessary, suppress such acts, in particular by taking effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect such materials and sources in accordance with their international obligations;*

3. *Encourages Member States to enhance their national capacities with appropriate means of detection and related architecture or systems, including through international cooperation and assistance in conformity with international law and regulations, with a view to reflecting and preventing the illicit trafficking of radioactive materials and sources;*

4. *Welcomes the entry into force on 7 July 2007 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism¹ and invites all Member States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify this instrument as soon as possible, in accordance with their legal and constitutional processes;*

5. *Invites Member States, in particular those producing and distributing radioactive sources, to support and endorse the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to enhance the safety and security of radioactive sources, as described in GC(51)/RES/11 of the General Conference and to enhance the security of radioactive sources as described in the Agency's Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009,² urges all States to work towards following the guidance contained in the Agency's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,³ including, as appropriate, the guidance on the import and export of radioactive sources, noting that the guidance is supplementary to the Code, and encourages Member States to notify the Director General of the Agency of their intention to do so pursuant to resolution GC(48)/RES/10 of the General Conference of the Agency;⁷*

6. *Recognizes the value of information exchange on national approaches to controlling radioactive sources, and takes note of the endorsement by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency of a proposal for a formalized process for a voluntary periodic exchange on information and lessons learned and for the evaluation of progress made by States towards implementing the provisions of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources;³*

7. *Welcomes the efforts undertaken by Member States, including through international cooperation under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to search for, locate and secure unsecured and/or uncontrolled ("orphan") radioactive sources within their State jurisdiction or territory;*

⁷ Ibid., *Forty-eighth Regular Session, 20-24 September 2004* (GC(48)/RES/DEC(2004)).

8. *Encourages* cooperation among and between Member States and through relevant international and, where appropriate, regional organizations aimed at strengthening national capacities in this regard;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fourth session an item entitled "Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources".

**General Assembly**

Distr.: Limited
18 October 2007

Original: English

Sixty-second session**First Committee**

Agenda item 97

**Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the
United Nations in the field of verification****Canada: draft resolution****Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the
United Nations in the field of verification**

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 59/60 of 3 December 2004, in which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a panel of government experts, to explore the question of verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification,

Noting two previous reports of the Secretary-General on the subject submitted in 1990 and 1995,¹

Recalling its request to the Secretary-General, its resolution 59/60 of 3 December 2004, to transmit to it the report of the Panel of Government Experts on verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification and the intent of the Panel to produce a report that is forward-looking and discerning of new trends and requirements,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Panel of Government Experts on verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification,² transmitted by the Secretary-General on 15 August 2007, acknowledges that the report was unanimously approved by the Panel of Government Experts and commends the report to the attention of Member States;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to give the report the widest possible circulation;

3. *Encourages* Member States to consider the report and invites Member States to offer additional views to the Secretary-General on the report;

¹ A/45/372 and Corr.1 and A/50/377 and Corr.1.

² A/61/1028.



4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session a compilation of views received from Member States, relevant United Nations organs and international treaty organizations with respect to the report;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fourth session the item entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification".